"Keep in mind that the past is not history, but a much vaster region of the dead, gone, unknowable, or forgotten. History is what we choose to remember."

This statement by Joseph J. Ellis in the preface to this insightful account of what we today call the American Revolution -- and what its participants termed "The Cause" -- challenges many of the popular and romanticized histories we've been taught about the founding of the nation.

As early as 1751, Benjamin Franklin imagined a future Anglo-American alliance and not an independent American nation. This was a view shared by a majority of his compatriots. They envisioned a place for the United States in the British Commonwealth similar to that later played by Canada and Australia.

What changed this was two major factors -- the rapid rate of growth of the colonies and the Seven Years' War, known in America as the French and Indian War.

As early as 1763, George III and his ministers recognized the difficulty of governing a colony in which the population doubled every 20 years, twice the rate of growth of Great Britain. The first part of a new imperial policy aimed at restricting the burgeoning population to a region between the Atlantic Coast and the Appalachians where it could be controlled by British troops. This did not sit well with the Irish and Scots-Irish immigrants, who were already surging over the mountains into territories claimed by Native American tribes.

Second, three acts aimed at easing the economic problems created by the late war were passed. The Stamp, Sugar, and Townshend acts imposed taxes and duties to reduce the enormous debt imposed by the long war and the additional expense of the 10,000 troops needed to police the colonies. Since these tariffs were intended to reduce the debt of a war fought on their behalf, it seemed fair to the authorities. The colonists felt otherwise.

Their reaction, beginning with the Boston Tea Party and other protests, precipitated the breach between Britain and the colonies, a breach many on both sides hoped could be resolved diplomatically. Even after the first shots were fired, some states were reluctant to enter the fray.

The colonists were wary of a standing army and early pinned their hopes on the militia units that had been so successful in the Indian wars. Soon after George Washington was appointed commander-in-chief, it became apparent to him and others with military experience that a more disciplined force modeled on the British army was needed. Despite the successes and loyalty of the Continental Army's officers and troops, Washington fought a constant battle with the politicians to pay, supply and give them the moral support needed to survive the challenges facing them.

Ellis skillfully traces both the political and the military maneuvers with insightful sketches of the major participants.

"Neither an American nation nor a viable national government existed at the end of the war," Ellis tells us. This was the result of the niggling of those in power over state's rights rather than a united purpose. The vision of Washington and a small group of men, many of them military officers, created the nation despite those who saw it as a betrayal of The Cause. And it is to them we owe our debt of gratitude.

One minor quibble I might point out is that Ellis refers to the Susquehanna River and the Wyoming Valley as being in western Pennsylvania. Geographically, both are actually in central Pennsylvania. Still, at the time, the river and valley were at the western edge of civilization since both were only opened to settlement in 1769. So, historically, the reference is correct.

[ visit Joseph J. Ellis online ]